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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VICKIE D. CROWTHER, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 860433 
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
This appeal presents for review the validity of two provi-
sions of Nationwide's Utah no-fault Endorsement. The effect of 
those provisions is not in dispute. Rather, Crowther chal-
lenges whether the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act 
prohibits an insurer from including the provisions in its 
contract. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-7 (Supp. 1985) -
(1) The coverage as described in § 31-41-6 shall 
be applicable: 
(a) Personal injuries sustained by the 
insured when injured in an accident in this state 
involving any motor vehicle. 
(b) Personal injuries arising out of auto-
mobile accidents occurring in this state sustained by 
any other natural person while occupying the described 
motor vehicle with the consent of the insured or while 
a pedestrian if injured in an accident involving the 
described motor vehicle. 
(2) When a person injured is also an insured 
party under any other policy, including those 
complying with this act, primary coverage shall be 
afforded by the policy insuring the motor vehicle out 
of the use of which the accident arose. 
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person 
under § 31-41-6 shall be reduced by: 
(a) Any benefits which that person receives 
or is entitled to receive as a result of an accident 
covered in this act under any workmen's compensation 
plan or similar statutory plan; and 
(b) Any amounts which that person receives 
or is entitled to receive from the United States or 
any of its agencies because of his or her being on 
active duty in the military services. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-10. - Exclusions from coverage - Any 
insurer may exclude benefits: 
(a) (i) For injuries sustained by the injured 
while occupying another motor vehicle owned by the 
insurance not insured under the policy, or 
(ii) for an injury sustained by any person 
while operating the insured motor vehicle without the 
express or implied consent of the insured or while not 
in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle. 
(b) To any injured person, if such person's 
conduct contributed to his injury under any of the 
following circumstances: 
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(i) Causing injury to himself 
intentionally; or 
(ii) While committing a felony. 
Utah Insurance Department Regulation 73-1/ Article 5, 
Paragraph (i) - It is the intent of the Act to provide a 
package of minimum Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits to 
each person injured in a motor vehicle accident occurring in 
Utah. The minimum PIP benefits are to be provided by the 
insurer of the motor vehicle which the person was occupying at 
the time of accident or by which he was struck as a pedes-
trian. The maximum amount of minimum PIP benefits an injured 
person may receive pursuant to involvement in a motor vehicle 
accident shall be those amounts specified under Section 
31-41-6. There shall be no stacking or duplication of such 
benefits. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Vickie Crowther, while a pedestrian, was struck by a motor 
vehicle and suffered bodily injury. She recovered medical 
benefits from the insurer of the vehicle which struck her and 
seeks in this action to recover additional medical benefits 
from her own no-fault insurer. 
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B. Course of Proceedings Below and Disposition. 
On June 16, 1986, Vickie Crowther moved for summary judg-
ment in her favor. On July 8, 1986, Nationwide filed its 
opposition to that motion and also filed a cross-motion for 
summary judgment in its favor. The motions were submitted to 
Judge Wilkinson on stipulated facts and oral argument was 
presented on July 18, 1986. Judge Wilkinson ruled orally in 
favor of Nationwide and against Vickie Crowther. On July 31, 
1986, judgment was entered denying Crowther's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and granting Nationwide's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
Judge Wilkinson was presented with the following stipulated 
facts: 
1. Defendant Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (herein-
after referred to as "Nationwide") is an insurer doing business 
in the State of Utah and with an office and place of business 
in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
2. On January 25, 1986, plaintiff was the insured under a 
policy of automobile insurance issued by Nationwide. 
3. The automobile insurance policy issued by Nationwide 
included Endorsement 1594 providing for personal injury protec-
tion. A true and correct copy of Endorsement 1594 is attached 
to these stipulated facts as Exhibit A. 
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4. On January 25, 1986, plaintiff sustained accidental 
bodily injury while a pedestrian when struck by a motor 
vehicle, other than her own, which was covered as required 
under ' ': Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act. 
5. As a direct a proximate result of the accident 
described in the preceding paragraph, plaintiff has incurred 
reasonable and necessary medical expenses in a sum in excess of 
$4,000. 
6. Plaintiff has been paid $2,000 in personal injury 
protection medical expense benefits by the insurer of the motor 
vehicle which struck her. 
7. $2,000 is the entire amount of personal injury protec-
tion medical expense benefits available under the policy 
describing the automobile which struck plaintiff. 
8. Plaintiff has made demand upon Nationwide for payment 
of $2,000 medical expense benefits pursuant to the terms of the 
policy under which she was an insured. 
9. Nationwide has failed within 35 days after receipt of 
proof of plaintiff's medical expenses, or at all, to pay 
personal injury protection medical expense benefits under the 
policy issued by it. 
10. Plaintiff does not claim to be entitled to more than 
$2,000 in benefits under the policy issued by Nationwide. 
(The foregoing facts are contained in the Stipulated Facts 
-5-
found in the record at R. 56-61, attached hereto including 
Endorsement 1594 as Addendum A.) 
11. In the section entitled OTHER INSURANCE, the Endorse-
ment states: 
Similar insurance may apply to an accident involving 
bodily injury to you or a relative, or bodily injury 
to someone else involving the use of your auto. If it 
does, all benefits payable cannot exceed the highest 
available under any one policy. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The summary judgment in favor of Nationwide should be 
affirmed. Nationwide's policy does not provide benefits to 
Vickie Crowther under the factual situation presented. The 
Other Insurance clause of the policy properly restricts Vickie 
Crowther from stacking any Nationwide benefits on top of the 
benefits she has already received. That restriction is 
consistent with the No-Fault Act, it is consistent with the 
Insurance Commissioner's Regulation and it is consistent with 
existing Utah case law. 
The Other Insurance clause is sufficient to uphold summary 
judgment for Nationwide; however, below Nationwide also 
asserted that exclusion (e) of the policy was a sufficient 
independent ground for the judgment. That exclusion eliminates 
coverage for injuries to a pedestrian insured when the motor 
vehicle in the accident provides no-fault benefits. On appeal 
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Nationwide does not rely on this exclusion because of this 
Court's ruling in Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call/ 712 P.2d 231 
(Utah 1985) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NATIONWIDE'S OTHER INSURANCE CLAUSE LIMITS 
VICKIE CROWTHER'S BENEFITS TO THE BENEFITS 
SHE HAS ALREADY RECEIVED. 
The effect of Nationwide's Other Insurance clause on Vickie 
Crowther's claim is clear. She received $2,000 in no-fault 
medical benefits from the insurer of the vehicle which struck 
her. Two thousand dollars was the limit on the benefits avail-
able under that policy. The Other Insurance section of 
u.itionwide * s Endorsement addresses this circumstance by stating: 
Similar insurance may apply to an accident involving 
bodily injury to you or a relative, or bodily injury 
to someone else involving the use of your auto. If it 
does, all benefits payable cannot exceed the highest 
available under any one policy. 
Here, both policies involved had a limit of $2,000 on 
medical expense benefits. Two thousand dollars is the highest 
amount available under any one policy. In this situation, 
Nationwide1s policy provides that all benefits payable cannot 
exceed $2,000. Of course, if the other policy had a stated 
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limit greater than $2,000, then that limit would have been the 
operative limit. 
In Point C of her brief, appellant discusses the Other 
Insurance clause. She does not contest the effect of the 
provision as set forth above. Rather, she contends that it is 
an exclusion which is not permitted by Utah's No-Fault Act. 
Although the impact of the No-Fault Act is addressed later, 
it should be clarified that the Other Insurance Clause is not 
an exclusion, but a limitation. The Other Insurance clause 
does not restrict the scope of coverage. In fact, coverage 
under Nationwide's policy must be presumed before the Other 
Insurance clause has any effect. If there is coverage under 
Nationwide's policy and another policy, then the provisions 
come into play to limit the amount of benefits recoverable. 
The clause does not eliminate coverage in the first instance 
and should therefore be viewed as a limitation on recovery 
rather than an exclusion of coverage. 
POINT II 
NATIONWIDE'S OTHER INSURANCE CLAUSE IS VALID 
UNLESS CONTRARY TO STATUTE OR PUBLIC POLICY. 
In preparing its Utah no-fault Endorsement, Nationwide 
chose to limit the benefits available to the highest amount 
available under any one policy. Nationwide has the right to 
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make this a r-- • ; of the contract because this limitation is not 
contrary to statute or to public policy. 
Even in the area of no-fault insurance, there remains room 
for freedom of contract. This Court recently acknowledged as 
much in Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 
1985). In that no-fault coverage case this Court stated: 
An insurer has the right to contract with an insured 
as to the risks it will or will not assume, as long as 
neither statutory law nor public policy is violated. 
Thus an insurer may include in a policy any number or 
kind of exceptions and limitations to which an insured 
will agree unless contrary to statute or public policy. 
Id. at 233. 
In Farmers v. Call, a household exclusion to no-fault 
coverage was invalidated because that exclusion was not 
specifically authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-10. The 
Court concluded that the household exclusion was contrary to 
the legislature's interest in requiring certain minimum 
coverage. _Id.' at 234. This reasoning probably also applies to 
Nationwide's exclusion (e) since the statute does not specifi-
cally allow an exclusion for injuries to an insured who is a 
pedestrian when struck by an otherwise insured vehicle. 
The judgment in favor of Nationwide in this case should be 
affirmed, but the basis for affirmance should be the Other 
Insurance clause, not exclusion (e), The Other Insurance 
clause is a limitation on the benefits available which 
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Nationwide had the option to include in its endorsement. The 
effect of that provision is to prevent a stacking of no-fault 
coverages from two or more policies. According to Farmers v. 
Call, Nationwide is free to include such a limitation and 
Vickie Crowther is free to accept such a limitation. 
POINT III 
THE NO-FAULT ACT DOES NOT REQUIRE STACKING,. 
Nationwide's decision to prohibit the stacking of its 
benefits on top of another insurer's benefits is not contrary 
to the No-Fault Act. Unlike the statutes of several other 
jurisdictions, Utah's statute simply does not address stack-
ing. Appellant admits this on page 10 of her brief where she 
states: "Utah's statutory no-fault scheme neither expressly 
permits nor prohibits so-called 'stacking' of benefits." If 
the statute does not speak on the question of stacking, then it 
must be within the latitude of the parties to the policy to 
deal with that question. 
Throughout appellant's brief she gingerly chooses her words 
to describe the effect of the statute. She claims the act 
allows stacking but never contends that the act requires 
stacking. There is a vast difference between a statute which 
allows the parties to stack limits if they chose to so draft 
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their contract and a statute which requires that the parties so 
draft their contract. 
Appellant's argument based on the language of the statute 
shoiild be rejected. She contends that use of the word 
"primary" in the statute "infers the possible existence" of 
excess coverage. Again, for the statute to infer the possible 
existence of excess coverage is vastly different from the 
statute expressly requiring that excess coverage be provided. 
Appellant points to no other evidence in the statute that the 
statute requires such stacking. The reference to primary 
coverage in the statute simply clarifies which coverage is 
primary jj[ there is more than one insurer providing coverage. 
To suggest that this statutory provision therefore requires an 
insurer to provide excess coverage is to stretch the rules of 
statutory construction beyond recognition. 
It would also be inconsistent with the stated purpose of 
the act to require stacking of no-fault benefits. The stated 
purpose of the act is to: 
[Rjequire the payment of certain prescribed benefits 
in respect to motor vehicle accidents through either 
insurance or other approved security but on the basis 
of no-fault, preserving, however, the right of an 
injured person to pursue the customary tort claims 
where the most serious types of injuries occur. The 
intention of the legislature is hereby to possibly 
stabilize, if not effectuate certain savings in, the 
rising costs of automobile accident insurance and to 
effectuate a more efficient equitable method of 
handling the greater bulk of the personal injury 
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claims that arise out of automobile accidents, these 
being those not involving great amounts of damages. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-2. Plainly, the Act is not intended to 
provide a more seriously injured person with an alternative to 
a customary tort action. It is intended to leave that remedy 
for those with injuries in excess of the no-fault limits. It 
is also intended, or at least hoped, that the No-Fault Act 
would reduce the costs of auto insurance. Requiring the 
payment of no-fault benefits to one who has already received 
such benefits in the statutory amounts undercuts these legis-
lative intents. Further, the legislature has demonstrated its 
concern for and ability to increase the statutory limits as the 
need arises. The Act was recently amended to increase the 
required medical benefits to $3,000. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-22-307(l)(a) (1986). 
The No-Fault Act was enacted to provide a quick remedy for 
persons with relatively minor injuries. It requires certain 
coverages and allows certain exclusions. However, so long as 
the requisite minimum benefits have been provided, the purpose 
of the No-Fault Act is accomplished. Private insurers and 
private insureds might choose to contract for additional 
no-fault coverage; however, it is contrary to the stated 
purpose of the act to construe it to require such additional 
coverage. The judgment for Nationwide should be affirmed 
because the clause limiting benefits is not contrary to Utah 
statute. 
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POINT IV 
PUBLIC POLICY DOES NOT REQUIRE STACKING. 
Public policy does not dictate that Nationwide be required 
to pay benefits when Vickie Crowther has already been paid the 
statutory amount. As discussed, the express policy of the 
No-Fault Act is to provide minimum benefits at low cost. 
Public policy is further reflected in the Insurance Commis-
sioner's Regulation, in prior Utah case law and in common 
sense. The opinions from other jurisdiction are largely not 
dispositive; however, they simply provide further good reasons 
for enforcing Nationwide's anti-stacking provision. 
1
 r- Insurance Commissioner has considered whether stacking 
of no-fault benefits should be allowed and has concluded that 
stacking should be prohibited. Indeed, for Nationwide to pay 
Vickie Crowther additional benefits would be in violation of 
Insurance Department Regulation 73-1, Art. V, If i. That 
section states in part: 
The maximum amount of minimum PIP benefits an injured 
person may receive pursuant to involvement in a motor 
vehicle accident shall be those amounts specified 
under Section 31-41-6. There shall be no stacking or 
duplication of such benefits. 
This regulation simply validates Nationwide's decision to 
include an anti-stacking provision in its endorsement. 
Appellant makes the unnecessary argument that the 
Commissioner exceeded his authority in issuing this 
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regulation. However, this argument adds nothing because 
appellant simply contends that the Commissioner exceeded his 
authority for the same reason as appellant contends the 
no-fault statute requires stacking. Certainly, if this Court 
were to conclude that stacking is required, then the Insurance 
Commissioner's Regulation would have no effect. 
However, the Insurance Commissioner has obviously con-
sidered the very question posed by this appeal and has done so 
in the context of the overall scheme of insurance benefits 
intended by the Legislature. Nationwide submits that the 
Insurance Commissioner's evaluation of whether to allow stack-
ing should be given considerable weight by this Court because 
the Commissioner is in the unique position of not only having 
full knowledge of the Legislature's actions regarding insurance 
but also of implementing those enactments. Charged with that 
duty, the Commissioner has concluded that the interests of the 
people of the State of Utah are best served by prohibiting the 
stacking of no-fault benefits. 
This Court found no good reason to require the stacking of 
uninsured motorist benefits in Martin v. Christensen, 22 Utah 
2d 415, 454 P.2d 294 (1969). There, an insurer issued two 
separate automobile policies which both contained uninsured 
motorist protection. Each policy contained a provision similar 
to Nationwide's Other Insurance clause which had the effect of 
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limiting recovery to the highest applicable limit of any one 
policy. This Court rejected the insured's argument that the 
insurer could not so limit its obligation, stating: 
The important fact would seem to be that, under one 
policy or two, the insured was protected against 
uninsured motorists to the extent the statute pre-
scribes. So long as that coverage is provided, there 
is nothing in the statute which would prevent an 
insurer, in issuing a second policy, from limiting its 
coverage to the statutory requirement. 
454 P.2d at 296. 
There is even less reason to stack no-fault coverage than 
there is to stack uninsured motorist coverage. Uninsured 
motorist coverage serves the function of providing an injured 
person with protection in the event a tort-feasor is without 
any insurance. That type of injured person has no meaningful 
remedy other than to the extent there is uninsured motorist 
coverage. There may be nothing more to collect after the 
uninsured motorist benefits have been paid. By contrast, 
Vickie Crowther has an additional remedy. Presumably, the 
no-fault insurer of the motor vehicle which struck her also 
provides insurance for the driver of that vehicle if he is 
found negligent. That consideration leaves even less reason 
for stacking to be required in the no-fault context. 
As appellant concedes, no court has ruled that Utah's 
No-Fault Act requires stacking. The statutes vary 
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significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, making the 
cases cited by appellant inapposite. 
In Wasche v. Milbank Mutual Insurance Co., 268 N.W.2d 913 
(Minn. 1978), the court relied on its holdings in the uninsured 
motorist context to conclude that the legislature intended to 
require stacking of no-fault benefits. The Minnesota No-Fault 
Act had been passed when stacking of uninsured coverages was 
the recognized rule. The court noted that had the legislature 
intended to prohibit stacking in either the no-fault context or 
the uninsured motorist context, it could have so provided. 
The exact opposite situation exists in Utah because of 
Martin v. Christensen, supra. That opinion was issued before 
the legislature enacted the No-Fault Act in 1973. Hence, if 
the reasoning of the Wasche court is applied to Utah, the 
conclusion should be that the legislature presumed anti-
stacking provisions were valid when it enacted the No-Fault Act 
and would have provided to the contrary if it had so intended. 
In Esler v. United Services Automobile Association, 2 73 
S.C. 259, 255 S.E.2d 676 (1979), the court permitted an insured 
who, unlike Vickie Crowther, had paid two separate premiums for 
additional personal injury protections under two policies to 
recover under both policies. The court clarified however that 
stacking of the basic personal injury protection benefits was 
not permitted because of the specific language of the South 
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Carolina statute. The present case is not one where the 
insured has chosen and paid for benefits over and above the 
requisite statutory minimum. 
In Porter v. Utah Home Fire Insurance Co., 58 Ore. App. 
729, 650 P.2d 130 (1982), the court based its decision that the 
legislature intended to require stacking in part on the 
insurance commissioner's commentary which addressed multiple or 
double recovery situations but did not express an intent to 
preclude stacking. By contrast, the Utah Insurance Commis-
sioner has expressly stated in Regulation 73-1 that stacking of 
no-fault benefits is not permitted. 
National General Insurance Co. v. Meeks, 145 Ga. App. 830, 
244 S.E.2d 920 (1978), is also distinguishable. There the 
Georgia statute under scrutiny required minimum medical bene-
fits of $2,500 but also stated that the total benefits to be 
paid should not exceed the sum of $5,000. There is also no 
indication in the opinion that the insurer had expressly 
limited its benefits to the highest available limit. 
In Baron v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 157 Ga. 
App. 16, 276 S.E.2d 78 (1981), the court was concerned with 
whether an insured could recover duplicate benefits, not 
additional benefits. The amount sought did not exceed the 
stated limit of either policy. The court did not consider the 
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effect of any other insurance clause which might have been in 
the policies under scrutiny. 
Finally, in Traveler's Insurance Co. v. Lopez, 567 P.2d 471 
(Nev. 1977), the court again considered whether an insured who 
had paid two premiums on two separate policies was entitled to 
stack the benefits. The court then construed the Other 
Insurance clause of the policies to apply only to duplication 
of benefits and not stacking. 
Several courts have expressly enforced anti-stacking provi-
sions such as that found in Nationwide's policy. Rana v. 
Bishop Insurance of Hawaii, Inc., 713 P.2d 1363 (Haw. 1985), is 
well-reasoned authority for this result. As in Utah, one of 
the primary purposes of the Hawaii no-fault act was to 
stabilize motor vehicle liability insurance premium rates. The 
court felt that the legislature had struck a balance between 
providing adequate and equitable reparation for the injured and 
keeping the cost of such reparation within the reach of every 
licensed driver. The court explained: 
The legislative history of the No-Fault Law evinces a 
legislative concern to reduce and stabilize automobile 
insurance costs prevailing prior to its enactment and 
to provide and maintain reasonable premium rates for 
no-fault basic coverage. We discern therefrom a legis-
lative intent to prohibit stacking which indubitably 
will lead to higher premiums for no-fault basic 
coverage. 
Id. at 1369. 
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Although the Hawaii statute differs from the Utah statute, the 
policy consideration noted by the Hawaiian court applies with 
full force. The Rana court acknowledged that there is "no 
majority rule regarding stacking of no-fault insurance policies 
and coverages." Id. at 1371. Nationwide submits that this 
simply means that the best basis for deciding the issue in Utah 
is the Utah act, the Utah regulation and prior Utah case law. 
In Kirsch v. Nationwide Insurance Company, 532 F. Supp. 766 
(W.D. Pa. 1982), the insured had a single policy which covered 
two vehicles and sought to stack the no-fault benefits appli-
cable to each vehicle. The court refused to allow this even 
though Pennsylvania courts had allowed stacking of uninsured 
motorist coverage. While in Utah even stacking of uninsured 
motorist benefits is not permitted, the differences between the 
purpose of no-fault insurance and the purpose of uninsured 
motorist coverage further underscore the propriety of not 
allowing stacking of no-fault benefits. As the Kirsch court 
stated: 
The No-Fault Act, on the other hand, has an entirely 
different purpose. The No-Fault Act provides for a 
specific amount of possible recovery to be awarded to 
victims of motor vehicle accidents, regardless of 
fault. This arrangement allows for prompt compensa-
tion to victims. However, once the statutory ceilings 
are exceeded, the negligent party is still liable for 
-19-
any further damages caused by his actions. The cause 
of action against the faulty driver is not limited at 
this point. 
Id. at 768. The court rejected the reasoning in an opinion 
from a lower court in Philadelphia because that couct ignored 
the legislative purpose of keeping down the cost of no-fault 
coverage. The court relied on the following language from 
another lower court Pennsylvania decision: 
Although the No-Fault Act declares essential the 
maximum feasible restoration of injured individuals 
and the compensation of economic losses, it also 
emphatically states and reiterates the need for its 
own purported design of a low-cost insurance system. 
532 F. Supp. at 770. 
The Rana court also distinguished between stacking of 
uninsured motorist coverages and stacking of no-fault 
coverages. In addition to quoting heavily from Kirsch, the 
court noted: 
Furthermore, under our uninsured motorist statute, 
although the automobile liability insurance policy 
must include uninsured motorist coverage, the insured 
may "reject the coverage in writing." However, as 
indicated supra, no-fault basic coverage is compulsory 
for each motor vehicle. "Because no-fault insurance 
is compulsory insurance, and it is important that the 
premiums be kept as well as possible while allowing 
adequate coverage, there is a public policy argument 
against stacking. 8 D Appleman, § 5192 at 613 
(footnote omitted). 
Id. at 1371. 
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In Davis v. Hughes, 229 Kan. 91, 622 P.2d 641 (1981), the 
Supreme Court of Kansas expressly dealt with the validity of 
policy endorsements prohibiting stacking. The endorsement 
provided that regardless of the number of persons insured or 
the number of applicable coverages, the amount of benefits 
recoverable under the policy were limited to the statutory 
amounts. The Kansas court concluded that "the intent of the 
statute is to permit insurance carriers to insert provisions 
and policies preventing "stacking" of PIP benefits - regardless 
of whether one or two policies are involved." 622 P.2d at 649. 
Other courts have also concluded that statutes requiring 
no-fault protection do not permit stacking. See Georgia 
Casualty Co. v. Waters, 146 Ga. App. 149, 246 S.E.2d 202 
(1978); Antanovich v. Allstate Insurance Company, 320 Pa. 
Super. 322, 467 A.2d 345 (1983) affd 507 Pa. 68, 488 A.2d 571 
(1985); and Guerrero v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 575 S.W.2d 
323 (Tex. App. 1978). 
In sum, public policy favors a restriction of Vickie 
Crowther's no-fault benefits to those which she has already 
received. Nationwide has chosen to so limit its benefits. 
That limitation is consistent with the design of the No-Fault 
Act to provide minimum benefits at minimum cost. Injured 
persons such as Vickie Crowther whose injuries exceed those 
levels are free to pursue their ordinary tort remedies. To 
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require stacking would lead to varying amounts of benefits to 
different injured persons depending solely on the number of 
no-fault coverages applicable. In concord with the Insurance 
Commissioner's decision to prohibit stacking, Nationwide's 
limitation serves the beneficent purpose of allowing Nationwide 
to keep its no-fault premium down while still insuring that 
Vickie Crowther receives the benefits required by the No-Fault 
Act. The judgment for Nationwide should be affirmed because 
public policy does not require the stacking of no fault 
benefits. 
POINT V 
REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME OF THIS APPEAL, 
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES. 
Appellant's request for attorneys' fees was properly 
denied. That request is based on a misapplication of Utah Code 
Ann. § 31-41-8. That section provides for recovery of attor-
neys' fees when an insurer refuses to pay overdue no-fault 
benefits. However, that section should not be applied to a 
case such as the present one where an insurer's obligation is 
in legitimate doubt. Appellant admits that the plain effect of 
the endorsement is to preclude her recovery. She further 
admits that this is the plain effect of the Insurance Commis-
sioner's Regulation. To expect that Nationwide should have 
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concluded its policy provisions were void and also should have 
concluded that the Insurance Commission exceeded its authority 
in issuing its regulation is incredible. 
This Court addressed and rejected a similar claim for 
attorney's fees in Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call/ 712 P.2d 231 
(Utah 1985) . There, the insured was successful in establishing 
that a household exclusion to no-fault benefits was contrary to 
public policy and statutory requirements. This Court neverthe-
less refused to award attorneys' fees and costs because there 
was no showing that the insurance company had acted in bad 
faith or fraudulently. The following statement from Farmers v. 
Call is directly applicable: 
An award of attorney fees is not warranted "where the 
plaintiff merely stated its position and initiated 
this action for determination of what appears to be a 
justiciable controversy." Western Casualty & Surety 
Co. v. Marchant, Utah, 615 P.2d 423, 427 (1980). We 
agree with the trial court that there is no foundation 
for the award of attorney fees and costs to the defen-
dant and affirm that portion of the judgment. 
Id. at 237-38. Similarly, here, regardless of the outcome of 
this appeal, Nationwide's reliance on its Other Insurance 
clause and the Insurance Commissioner's Regulation was plainly 
in good faith. An award of attorneys' fees to either party to 
this controversy would be inappropriate. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Nationwide respectfully submits 
that the ruling of the lower court should be affirmed on the 
grounds that Nationwide's anti-stacking provision is valid and 
enforceable. 
DATED this Q"^ day of November, 1986. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
RayrpeJ^ fa I^^&ferry 
R. Lund 
:orneys for Respondent 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance 
Company 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I did cause to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, four copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to 
Stephen H. Lybbert, Suite 114, Oquirrh Place, 350 South 400 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
D day of November, 1986 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
VICKIE D. CROWTHER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
STIPULATED FACTS 
Civil No. C86-2548 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
Plaintiff, by and through her attorney, Steven H. 
Lybbert, and defendant, by and through its attorney, John R. 
Lund, stipulate to the following facts. In doing so, coun-
sel agree that other facts not stipulated to may be relevant 
to the issues raised in the pleadings. 
STIPULATED FACTS 
1. Defendant Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company 
(hereinafter referred to as "Nationwide") is an insurer 
doing business in the State of Utah and with an office and 
place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
ADDENDUM "A" 
uoooi 
2. On January 25, 1986, plaintiff was the insured 
under a policy of automobile insurance issued by Nationwide. 
3. The automobile insurance policy issued by 
Nationwide included Endorsement 1594 providing for personal 
injury protection coverage. A true and correct copy of 
Endorsement 1594 is attached to these Stipulated Facts as 
Exhibit "A". 
4. On January 25, 1986, plaintiff sustained acci-
dental bodily injury while a pedestrian when struck by a 
motor vehicle, other than her own, which was covered as re-
quired under the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act. 
5. As a direct and proximate result of the accident 
described in the preceding paragraph, plaintiff has incurred 
reasonable and necessary medical expenses in a sum in excess 
of $4,000.00. 
6. Plaintiff has been paid $2,000.00 in personal 
injury protection medical expense benefits by the insurer of 
the motor vehicle which struck her. 
7. Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) is the entire 
amount of personal injury protection medical expense benefits 
available under the policy describing the automobile which 
struck plaintiff. 
8. Plaintiff has made demand upon Nationwide for 
payment of $2,000.00 medical expense benefits pursuant to 
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the terms of the policy under which she was an insured. 
9. Nationwide has failed within thirty-five 
(35) days after receipt of proof of plaintiff's medical 
expenses, or at all, to pay personal injury protection 
medical expense benefits under the policy issued by it. 
10. Plaintiff does not claim to be entitled to 
more than $2,000.00 in benefits under the policy issued by 
Nationwide. 
DATED this /^ A day of June, 1986. 
Steven H. Lybbert 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
DATED this Jlo1 day of June, 1986. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
*? 
Johrt/'R. Lund 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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Endorbemen 1594 
personal injury protection 
(Utah) 
Please attach this important addition to your Century II policy. 
.With this endorsement your Century II auto policy is amended to provide Personal Injury Protection. Coverage is subject to all 
terms and conditions of your policy, except as changed by this endorsement. 
SECTION I 
PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE 
We wilt pay benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. It pays 
regardless of fault in the accident. Benefits include Medical Expenses, Work Loss, Funeral Expenses, and Survivors* Loss 
benefits. 
For purposes of this coverage: 
1. the words "you" and "your" mean the policyholder first named in the attached Declarations. They do not include that 
policyholder's spouse. 
2. the word "relative" means your spouse, any other person related to you by blood, marriage, and a ward or foster child. A 
relative may temporarily be living elsewhere. 
3. the words "bodily injury94 mean bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death. 
4. the words "motor vehicle9* mean any vehicle of a kind that must be registered with the Division of Motor Vehicles of the Utah 
State Tax Commission under Title 4I-I-19, Utah Code Annotated 1953. A motor vehicle does not include a motorcycle. 
5. the word "insured9* means a relative or anyone using your auto with your permission. 
You and your relatives are covered for bodily injury caused by accident involving the use of any motor vehicle. 
Other persons are covered, provided your auto is not a motorcycle, as follows: 
1. While occupying your auto with your consent or the permission of an insured. 
2. While occup) ing any motor vehicle other than your auto, if it is not used to carry persons for a fee. Such motor vehicle must 
be operated by you or a relative. Shared-expense car pools will not be considered carrying persons for a fee. 
3. As a pedestrian if hit by your auto. Anyone occupying a motorcycle is not a pedestrian. 
We will pay benefits minus any deductible per person, per accident shown in your policy Declarations. Benefits are as follows: 
MEDICAL EXPENSES We will pay reasonable and necessary medical expenses incurred. We will pay them up to $2000 per 
person, per accident. We will pay for the following: medical, surgical, x-ray, ambulance, hospital, nursing, dental, prosthetic, 
and rehabilitation services and any recognized religious healing method. For hospital services, we will pay only up to the 
semi-private room charge unless more intensive medical care is needed. 
(Continued on other tide) 
EXHIBIT "A" 
Auto 702I-72-S-79 
WORK LOSS We will pay for the covered person's loss of income if he is unable to worx oecause of the bodily injury. We will 
pay for income lost beginning three days after the accident, and for up to the 52 weeks after that day. If the insured is unable to 
work for the first two weeks after the accident we will pay for income lost beginning the day after the accident, and for up to 52 
weeks after that day. We will pay for 85% of lost gross income, not to exceed $150 per week. We will only pay, however, for 
income lost during the covered person's lifetime. 
We will alsc pay for services the covered person would have performed for his household, but for the bodily injur). We will pay-
up to $12 per day. We will pay for expenses incurred beginning three days after the accident, and for up to 365 days after that 
day. If the insured is unable to perform such household services for the first 14 days after the accident, we will pay beginning the 
day after the accident, and for up to the 365 days after that day. We will pay for expenses incurred only during the person's 
lifetime. 
FUNERAL EXPENSES If the covered person dies from the bodily injury, we will pay for funeral and burial or cremation 
expenses incurred. We will pay up to $1,000. 
SURVIVORS' LOSS If the covered person dies from the bodily injury, we will pay $2,000 to his natural heirs. 
COVERAGE EXCLUSIONS 
1. We will not pay for bodily injury to anyone arising from any of the following: 
a. The insured's intentional act. 
b. Committing a felony. 
c. Operating your auto without the consent of the insured or while not in lawful possession of it. 
d. Occupying a motor vehicle you own but do not insure under this endorsement. 
• e. Occupying or being hit as a pedestrian by any motor vehicle, other than your auto, which is covered as required under 
the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act. 
f. Using a motor vehicle located as a residence or premises 
g. Any act of war. 
h. Any hazard of nuclear material. 
2. We will not pay for bodily injury to you or a relative while occupying a motor vehicle owned by a relative and not insured as 
required under the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act. 
3. We will not pay for bodily injury to anyone entitled to benefits under Utah's Workmen's Compensation Law. 
INSURED PERSONS' DUTIES 
The insured or someone for him will promptly report any accident to us in writing This report will identify injured persons. It 
will give information about the time, place, and circumstances of the accident. 
The insured or someone for him will promptly submit written proof of claim to us. This will be under oath if we require The 
proof will give all necessary information for us to determine benefits and amounts payable. The insured will submit to physical 
and mental examinations, by physicians we choose, whenever we reasonably request. 
If the insured, his legal representative, or his survivors bring an action against anyone for the bodily injury, a cop> of the 
summons or complaint or other process served will be promptly forwarded to us. 
LIMITS AND CONDITIONS OF PAYMENT 
BENEFITS PAYABLE Insuring more than one person or vehicle under your policy does not increase our liability to one 
person in one accident. 
We will reduce any amount payable by any amount paid, payable, or required as follows: Under any workmen's compensation 
or similar plan except Utah's Workmen's Compensation Plan. By the United States or any of its agencies related to active 
military duty. 
UUOG 
]~HER INSURANCE No insured may * -ive duplicate benefits under this and any si »«r insurance 
milar insurance may apply to an accident involving bodily injury to you or a relative, or bodily injury to someone else 
volvmg the use of your auto If it does, all benefits payable cannot exceed the highest available under any one policy We will 
ly our proportional share of such benefits That share will be our proportion of the total benefits available 
• 
mtlar insurance may apply to an accident that does not involve you, a relative, or use of your auto If it does, we will pay only 
/cr and above what is available under the other insurance 
RUST AGREEMENT 
o the extent of any pay ment we make for a loss, we arc entitled to any payment to the insured by anyone legally liable for the 
E>dily injury The insured will hold in trust for us his rights of recovery against any such party He will do whatever is proper to 
cure such rights He will do nothing to prejudice them All related papers and instruments will be executed and delivered to us. 
UBROGATION 
/e have the right of subrogation This means that after paying a loss, we will have the insured's right to sue for or otherwise 
:cover the amount of our payment from anyone who may be liable The insured will do nothing to prejudice this right The 
isured will sign all papers and do whatever is necessary to transfer this right to us 
ASSIGNABILITY 
Jo interest in your policy can be transferred without our written consent However if you die, this coverage will stay in force 
ar the rest of the policy period for others who were entitled to coverage when you died 
SECTION II 
>REMIUM RECOMPUTATION 
We have certain rigl ts if there is a judicial finding that any provisions of the Utah Automobile No-Fault insurance law limiting 
awsuits are invalid We will have the right to recompute the premium for any coverage under this policy We will also have the 
•lghi to void or amend the provisions of this endorsement 
SECTION III 
DTHER COVERAGES 
Wt will pay benefits under any Medical Payments coverage provided by this policy only over and above any Personal Injury 
Protection benefits that are paid or payable for bodily injury under this or any other policy This includes any benefits that 
would be p.i\nhlc except for a deductible provision 
The limits of and any amounts payable under Uninsured Motorists coverage will be reduced by sums paid or payable under any 
Personal lniur\ Protection coverage This includes any benefits that would have been paid or payable except for a deductible 
provision 
This endorsement applies as stated in the Declarations attached to your policy 
The endorsement is issued by the Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company or Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 
whichever has issued the policy to which it is attached 
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY 
Columbus, Ohio 
Oil f34z*fr~L ^c2ea<<&«^ 
SXJ Secretary Pretutent (J (J U 0 
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JOHN R. LUND 
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10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
VICKIE D. CROWTHER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs • 
NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT AND GRANTING DEFEN-
DANT !S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C86-2548 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment having come on regularly 
for hearing before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Third 
District Judge, on July 18, 1986, at 10:00 a.m., plaintiff 
having been represented by her counsel, Steven H. Lybbert, 
and defendant having been represented by its counsel, John R. 
Lund, and the Court having reviewed the memoranda filed here-
in, having heard oral argument and having been fully advised 
it is hereby 
ORDERED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied, 
ADDENDUM "B 
OOO'J 
granted. 
2. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is 
Each party will bear their own costs. 
DATED this 3/day of July, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to Form: 
Steven H. Lybbe^ rt 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
</--
omer F. Wilkinson, Judge 
Third Judicial District 
John R^Cund 
Attorney for Defendant 
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